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PART II
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
The principal control by the Federal Government of the relations
between a state and private persons prior to passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment was by means of the contract clause. 200 No clause, there-
fore, had to be construed so frequently by the Supreme Court in the
early Nineteenth Century. 201 After the "due process" clause was
adopted in 1868 however, the contract clause played a less significant
role. Both clauses now became possible grounds for Supreme Court
decisions. 20 2  But prior to 1868 and during the entire span of John-
son's judicial term, the contract clause was most vital.
When the Constitutional Convention assembled in 1787, this
clause was not unknown. Six weeks previously it had been adopted
in the Northwest Ordinance which created the governmental system
for the land north of the ,Ohio River. Also, the creditor class, the
interested proponent of the Constitution, especially desired this protec-
tive clause to safeguard commercial transactions. 203 The actual
framers of the Constitution applauded the wisdom of enacting this
Section. James -Madison indicated the desire of the Nation for a
stable.financial policy.2 0 4 Alexander Hamilton perceived that the con-
tract section was a method to extinguish the hostile commercial statutes
among the states. 20 -  Despite the seemingly wide favor of a clause to
prohibit state laws impairing the obligitions of contracts, the facts sur-
rounding the adoption of this particular clause were curious. On the
Convention floor, merely the "bills of attainder" and "ex post facto law"
200. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § I0: "No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attain-
der, ex post facto law, or Law Impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... " Note
(1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 476.
201. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938), c. XIII.
202. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, et al., 26o U. S. 393 (1922), where both
the contract and "due process" clauses were possible bases for decision, the Supreme
Court utilized both sections to hold unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute which pro-
hibited the mining of coal, a right reserved to the grantor in a contract deed. See
Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 476, at 493, where it was said. ". . . in future years the
[contract] clause will have left to it only the satisfaction of having contributed its part
in shaping the place of the contract in the all-powerful due process of law." See also
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930).
203. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 201, at 3-8.
2o4. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (Everyman's ed. 1934) at 228.
205. Id. No. 7 at 30.
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phrases were accepted. Since a few delegates believed that "ex post
facto law" applied only to criminal statutes, plans to add another phrase
for civil statutes were promulgated. Meanwhile, the draft of the docu-
ment had been sent to Gouveneur Morris, Chairman of the Revision
Committee, to perfect the wording. Without authority, Morris attached
to Section io of Article I : 206
"No State shall pass . . . laws altering or impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts."
The Convention received the perfected draft, struck out the words
"altering or," and adopted the remainder of the clause.
This historical incident, however, did not refute the theory that
commercial interests promoted this protective prohibition against State
laws. On the contrary, at least two delegates to the Convention have
expressed the need for security to commerce. 207  In such manner was
the protection of the commercial class created. How did the Supreme
Court and Justice Johnson react?
In 1795, the Georgia Legislature granted twenty million 208 acres
of land in the Yazoo Valley to four land companies 209 for $5oo,ooo.
Although Georgia's "title to the land conveyed was questionable, both
parties of the transaction considered the sale consummated. Appar-
ently the bargain was a fair one for the State. History, however, has
disclosed the Yazoo land sale as the worst public fraud in American
life because the State legislators were openly bribed to pass these legis-
lative grants.2 10  The four grantee companies immediately transferred
the titles to Northern land companies who in turn sold the land to the
innocent general public.2 11  Most of these transactions occurred before
1796 when Eli Whitney's cotton gin celebrated its third birthday and
was acknowledged a practical success: The revolutionary effect of this
invention on Southern agriculture became apparent, so the rich, black
soil of the Yazoo Valley skyrocketed in value. Georgia citizens, dis-
206. MILLER, LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (I89I) 528. See pp. 526-28 for
other facts on the adoption of § io.
207. 2 BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTI N (1882) 214. The quotation was
an excerpt from a letter by Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, the second Chief
Justice of the United States, to the Governor of Connecticut recommending the adop-
tion of the Constitution.
208. See I WARREN, THE SUPREmE COURT (1922) 392-99. Because of poor sur-
veyor's maps, the actual amount of land transferred was thirty-five million acres.
209. The Georgia Co., The Georgia-Mississippi Co., The Upper Mississippi Co.,
The Tennessee Co.
210. UMBREIT, Oua EL=N CHiEF JusTIcEs (1938) 175. See also I WAREN, loc.
cit. supra note 208.
21. For example, the Georgia Co. sold its titles to the New England-Mississippi
Co., a corporation of Boston capitalists, which sold exclusively to individual land in-
vestors in New England and the Middlewest.
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covering the gross fraud of the Legislators and the increased value of
the land, clamored for action. A completely new Legislature was
elected on the pledge that it would undo the evils of the old; so in 1796
a statute was enacted revoking the 1795 grants. But the question
still remained as to how the titles could be reacquired from the bona
fide purchasers.
212
With this question still unsettled, Georgia transferred to the Fed-
eral Government after Jefferson's inauguration its claim to the Yazoo
Valley land. Many Congressmen felt the titles in the innocent buyers
should not be recognized after such an outrageous legislative scandal.
Public opinion grew so violent over the dishonest affair that Jefferson
appointed a Commission of three cabinet members to solve the prob-
lem. 13 They recommended that five million acres be set aside to
settle 'all title claims held by innocent purchasers on a pro rata basis.
Jefferson supported the proposal; however, the Southern wing of the
Republicans guided by John Randolph of Virginia thwarted any Con-
gressional action. After twelve years and no settlement, it occurred
to the various claimants that relief might be had from the federal
judiciary, as yet a little-used department of the national government.
These facts were the background for the celebrated case of Fletcher
v. Peck 214 presented in 18io. John Peck, an innocent purchaser,
had conveyed a deed for a plot of Yazoo Valley land to Robert Fletcher
for $3,ooo. The Court had to determine if the covenants in the deed
which asserted legislative authority to make the grant were broken
by the revoking law of 1796. Marshall spoke for the majority.215 He
held the land sale by the Legislature valid, for the Georgia Constitution
did not prohibit such a grant. The defendant's allegations of legisla-
tive fraud bore no weight with the Chief Justice as the Judiciary had
no power to question the Legislator's motives in enacting any statute.
Then the important problem of the effect of the 1796 Revoking Act
was answered. On general principle an executed land contract can-
not be annulled even by a state where the bona fide purchaser, has ac-
quired legal title. But the nub of the majority opinion denied opera-
tion of the Revoking Statute because it impaired the obligations of
the land contracts; hence, the act was repugnant to the Federal Con-
212. The history of the great land fraud is best explained in i WARREN, loc. cit.
supra note 2o8, and UmBRRT, op. cit. supra note 210, at 174-78.
213. Secretary of State Madison, Secretary of Treasury Gallatin, and Attorney-
General Lincoln.
214. 6 Cranch-87 (U. S. i8io). Fletcher declared the Georgia Legislature had no
authority to grant the title so Peck's covenant was broken. Peck pleaded that the
Governor of Georgia had authority to grant the land. Fletcher demurred to this plea.
This demurrer was sustained for if Fletcher "tendered an issue of fact upon this plea,
it would have been a departure from his declaration." Id. at 126. After amending the
plea, Fletcher again demurred and a rehearing on the principal issues was held.
215. Id. at 127.
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stitution and void. Thus, for the first time, the Supreme Court had
held a state statute unconstitutional.
16
Justice Johnson concurred in the result; 217 but he specifically re-
frained from deciding the case on the constitutional issue .2 8  He
contended: 219
"I do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the
power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general prin-
ciple, on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will
impose laws even on the deity.
" . When the legislature have once conveyed their interest
or property in any subject to the individual, they have lost all
control over it; have nothing to act upon; it has passed from
them;, is vested in the individual; becomes intimately blended
with his existence, as essentially as the blood that circulates
through his system."
Since the 1796 Revoking Act was inoperative, the Justice deemed
it unnecessary to discuss the contract clause. And in addition he crit-
icized severely the broad interpretation which Marshall had given to
this prohibition. Marshall had stated: 220
"Why, then, should violence be done to the natural meaning of
words for the purpose of leaving to the Legislature the power of
seizing, for public use, the estate of an individual in the form of
a law, annulling the title by which he holds that estate? The
court can perceive no sufficient grounds for making this distinc-
tion."
The Chief Justice "scarcely conceived" how an "argument in favour
of presuming an intention to except a case, not excepted by the words
of the constitution," could be endorsed.
2 2
1
But Johnson replied: 222
"To give it the general effect of a restriction of the state powers
in favour of private rights, is certainly going very far beyond the
obvious and necessary import of the words, and would operate
216. See I CARsoN, THE SuPEmE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1892) 219.
One state court had already been confronted with the general issues decided in Flt-
cher v. Peck. In Derby v. Blake, 226 Mass. 619 (I799), the plaintiff endorsee sued
defendant endorser on a promissory note. Plaintiff had given defendant a subscrip-
tion to Yazoo Valley land as consideration for defendant's endorsement. The defense
was "no consideration" because the Revoking Act had annulled this subscription. This
defense was denied for the executed legislative grant in the possession of a buyer could
not be revoked, and the Georgia statute of 1796 was voided by the contract clause.
217. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 143 (U. S. i8io).
218. "I have thrown out these ideas that I may have it distinctly understood that
my opinion on this point is not founded on the provision in the Constitution of the
United States, relative to laws impairing the obligation of contracts." Id. at i44.
219. Id. at 143.
220. Id. at 138.
221. Id. at 139.
222. Id. at 145.
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to restrict the states in the exercise of that right which every com-
munity must exercise, of possessing itself of the property of the
individual, when necessary for public uses . ,, 223
In a situation requiring no constitutional decision, William Johnson
had refused a judicial interpretation of that document. In addition
he indicated the weakness of the Chief, Justice's broad application of
the contract clause. Thirty-eight years later, the Supreme Bench in-
voked Johnson's analysis of this limitation on the impairment prohibi-
tion. In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix et al.,224 Justice Daniel,
speaking for the Court, held that the contract clause, as Johnson had
already hinted, did not prohibit the states from enacting laws to impair
contract obligations in order to possess private property for public use.
Another criticism of the majority decision was enunciated by the
Justice. He had "extreme difficulty" in defining or limiting the words,
"obligation of contracts ;" 225 so where it was needless to become in-
volved in this delicate task he deemed it wise for the Court to refrain
from any definition. This reluctance to decide a constitutional ques-
tion where it was not essential was best displayed in his final para-
graph: 226
"I have been very unwilling to proceed to the decision of this cause
at all. It appears to me to bear strong evidence, upon the face of
it, of being a mere feigned case. It is our duty to decide on the
rights, but not on the speculations of parties. My confidence,
however, in the respectable gentlemen who have been engaged
for the parties, has induced me to abandon my scruples, in the be-
lief that they would never consent to impose a mere feigned case
upon this court." 227
223. See Johnson, The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution (1928)
16 Ky. L. J. 222, 224-5, wherein a criticism of this analysis is presented: "It is of some
interest as to the early conception of the clause, however, to note that he regards the
provision as being too equivocal to form the basis of restricting the states' power to
interfere in private contracts. . . . It is apparent that in this regard justice John-
son lacked the prescience of a Madison and the fatal logic of a Marshall." Madison's
prescience was found in THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (Everyman's ed. 1934), where he
discussed the obectives of the contract clause. Certainly it was arguable that Justice
Johnson did not intend to state that Section IO was equivocal, but rather he wished to
warn that some contract obligations would have to be impaired in order to protect cer-
tain sovereign rights as the right of eminent domain.
224. 6 Howard 5o7 (U. S. 1848). Plaintiff was granted a charter by Vermont
to corstruct a bridge in 1795 to remain one hundred years. After the bridge was built,
defendant under authority of a Vermont statute of 1839 sought to appropriate the pri-
vate bridge for a public road offering just compensation. Plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion; defendant demurred. The Supreme Court dismissed the bill.
225. See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 145 (U. S. i81o).
226. Id. at 147.
227. The "respectable" counsel for Peck, seeking to sustain the validity of the
grants, were John Quincy Adams and Robert Goodloe Harper, a noted Federalist
politician. Adams botched his argument badly. His self-consciousness caused him
much difficulty when speaking. On reargument Joseph Story replaced Adams. See
BATEs, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1936) io8. Lfuther Martin, Attorney-
General of Maryland and for thirty years an outstanding attorney, was counsel for
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Johnson's accusation of a "feigned case" was extraordinary, but the
fact that he was correct in his suspicion was even more startling. It
indicated Marshall's blindness to case or controversy, and his sole de-
sire to define the extent of federal power, particularly the power of
the Supreme Court.22 8  Once before the Supreme Court .had decided
a "feigned" case,2 29 but the settled principle so firmly announced by
Justice Johnson has been to deny an opinion unless an authentic con-
troversy was presented.230  Johnson's shifting of the responsibility
and blame to the counsel offered a means of escape from entering a
stronger statement against the "feigned" case. Both Jefferson and
Madison desired a decision on the case to bolster their compromise set-
tlement of the problem. Undoubtedly Johnson accepted their wishes
allowing the decision to pass with only his vigorous warning.2 31 As a
practical matter, the victory for the innocent purchasers had little effect.
Not until 1814 when Randolph left Congress was the settlement of
five million acres effected to give unclouded legal titles to the Northern
claimants.
2 32
Fletcher. Martin was a heavy drinker in an age of heavy drinkers. During his argu-
ment in Fletcher v. Peck, he was so intoxicated that the Court adjourned to keep him
from completing his argument. See 3 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL(1919) 186 n. 1, 586 n. i.
228. See i WARREN, op. cit. supra note 2o8, at 398-9; UMBREIT, op. cit. supra note
21o, at 177-8. Justice Livingston told Adams at Madison's Inaugural Ball in March,
18o9, when the first arguments were being heard that the Court was reluctant to de-
cide on a case created merely to obtain an opinion on the speculative issues involved.
Marshall, himself, stated the same idea to Chief Judge William Cranch of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court. 3 BEvR=nE, op. cit. supra note 227, at 585.
229. In Hylton v. United States, 3 Dallas 171 (U. S. 1796), the United States
argued both sides of the question of a tax on carriages. If the tax were direct then
being unapportioned it would be unconstitutional. Thus the Federalist doctrine of judi-
cial review would be established. If the tax were indirect and valid, it would bear
more heavily on the Southern Republicans who had more carriages than Northern
Federalists. Since either decision resulted in victory, the opportunity for an opinion
could not pass the Federalist administration unheeded. BATES, loc. cit. supra note 227.
Attorney-General Charles Lee and Alexander Hamilton argued for the tax's validity
while Attorney-General Ingersol of Pennsylvania and United States District Attorney
Campbell of Virginia, who had originally sued defendant to collect the tax, sought to
void the tax. Hylton v. United States, supra; at 171-2. The tax was held indirect
and valid.
23o. See Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, et al., 297 U. S. 288, 346 (935) : "The court will not pass upon the consti-
tutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to
decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. It never was
the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislativd act.'"
See also United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377 (1940).
Justice Reed's opinion for the court on the scope of the federal commerce power said
at 423: "The briefs and arguments at the bar have marshaled reasons and precedents
to cover the wide range df possible disagreement between Nation and State in the func-
tioning of the Federal Power Act. To predetermine, even in the limited field of water
power, the rights of different sovereignties, pregnant with future controversies, is be-
yond the judicial function. The courts deal with concrete legal issues, presented in
actual cases, not abstractions."
231. See 3 BEvERmnGE, op. cit. supra note 227, at 592-3.'
232. BATES, op. cit. supra note 227, at 1O9; UmBSRnAiT, op. cit. upra note 21o, at
177-8.
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Not until i818 did the contract clause create a further constitu-
tional problem. In that year, Dartmouth College appealed from a
judgment denying a trover action against Woodward, its former Sec-
retary and Treasurer, for the College records and seal.2 33  Woodward
denied the College's title to this personalty claiming that two New
Hampshire statutes of i816 had abolished the College Board of Trus-
tees,, plaintiff in the suit. A royal charter of 1769 had created this
Board of Trustees. The question was whether the State could impair
the obligations of this charter. A skillful argument by Daniel Web-
ster supporting the College Trustees still left the justices undecided:
Marshall and Washington favored the college; Duval and Todd obdu-
rately supported Woodward; Johnson and Livingston were neutral.
With the decision. postponed until the 18i9 Term when reargument
was to be made -at Woodward's request, Rev. Francis Brown, President
of Dartmouth College, visited the great Chancellor Kent in Albany,
New York, and one of the College Trustees presented to the learned
Judge a copy of Webster's argument. Kent's original impression held
the College a public corporation. If so, New Hampshire had the sov-
ereign power of altering the charter of the public body at will. Web-
ster's analysis of the College as a private corporation changed Kent's
notion. When Justice Johnson, later in 1818, visited the New York
capital, he discussed the case with Kent. Livingston did likewise.
Both became convinced, thereby, that the College was a private corpo-
ration, and New Hampshire could not impair the obligations of its
charter. 234
Also in the summer of 1818, Marshall was busy. Without a
majority determined, he wrote his opinion. When the i8I9 Term be-
gan and William Pinckney arose to present Woodward's reargument,
the Chief Justice ignored him for he now had Johnson's and Livings-
ton's support. Waving the counsel aside, he announced a decision
had been reached, then read his memorable opinion.235
Justice Johnson rendered no opinion in this case; he openly con-
curred, however, with Marshall's reasoning.236  In substance, the
Chief Justice held the College to be a private corporation so that its
233. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 18,9).
234. See 4 BEVERIDGE, op. Cit. supra note 227, at 256-8 and notes; CoRwiN, JoHN
MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION (1919) 164.
235. See Hagan, The Dartnwuth College Cases (1931) i9 GEo. L. J. 411, 424-5.
236. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 666 (U. S.
1819). Johnson's practice of openly voting on important cases even if he rendered no
opinion was praised by Jefferson. See 4 RANDOLPH, JEFFERSON'S ComSPxONDENcE
(1830) 375, Letter to Justice Johnson on June 12, 1823: "Why should not egery judge
be asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only by yea or nay? Besides ascer-
taining the fact of his opinion, which the public have a right to know, in order to judge
whether it is impeachable or not, it would show whether the opinions were unanimous
or not, and thus settle more exactly the weight of their authority."
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charter was a contract to be protected by Section IO of Article i. Since
the New Hampshire statutes impaired the obligations created by the
charter, they were unconstitutional. Hence, the Board of Trustees had
legal title to the College records and seal, and trover could be main-
tained. A reversal of the New Hampshire court's judgment for
Woodward, therefore, was declared. 237  But Marshall heeded John-
son's earlier warning that the contract clause could not apply to some
contracts. The Chief Justice refused to give such a sweeping interpre-
tation to Section io as announced in Fletcher v. Peck.238 He defi-
nitely qualified the application of this clause.23
9
Although no formal opinion was tendered by Johnson, his influence
on Marshall's opinion was discernible. He formed the necessary
majority for the celebrated opinion; his opinion in Fletcher v. Peck
probably aided the Chief Justice to recognize that certain limits were
required on the contract clause prohibition.
The next state statutes involving Justice Johnson and Section IO
were the Kentucky Property Acts of 1797 and 1812 arising in Green
v. Biddle.240 When Kentucky separated from Virginia, a compact
was made with the new state promising: 241
'that all private rights, and interests of lands within the
said District' (of Kentucky) 'derived from the laws of Virginia
prior to such separation, shall remain valid and secure under the
laws of the proposed State, and shall be determined by the laws
now existing in this State.'" [Virginia].
In the 1797 and 1812 Acts, Kentucky provided for certain legal relief
for the adverse possessor who improved the land possessed, which relief
was not permitted in Virginia.242  A suit to procure a writ of right
for possession presented the issue of the contract clause to the Circuit
Court which certified the question of the constitutionality of the Ken-
tucky legislation. Justice Story summarily held the legislation repug-
nant to Section io with no dissent from his colleagues. 24 3  The people
of Kentucky, aroused over this decision, accused the Supreme Court
of usurping personal liberties and states' rights. 244  The bitter feeling
237. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat 518, 624-666 (U. S.
i8ig).
238. See page 346.
239. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 628 (U. S. i8ig).
240. 8 Wheat. i (U. S. 1823).
241. Id. at 3.
242. The adverse possessor was not liable for rents and profits prior to actual no-
tice of the legal owner. The person ejected from land might recover the value of perma-
nent improvements he had made. Any rents or profits received by the adverse
possessor after actual notice of the legal owner could be used to pay the value of the
permanent improvements, etc.
243. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. I, 10-17 (U. S. 1823).
244. 2 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 2o8 at 97-99.
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and the importance of the problem required the Supreme Bench to
grant Henry Clay a rehearing.245 The final decision, rendered in
1823, came from Justice Washington, Marshall's alter ego.246  The
majority found the answer to the question to be that the Kentucky
Statutes impaired the obligation of the contract between the two
States. 247 A strict'test to determine what was impairment came from
the opinion: 248
"The objection to a law, on the ground of its impairing the obli-
gation of a contract, can never depend upon the extent of the
change which the law effects in it. Any deviation from its terms
. . . howevef minute or apparently immaterial, in their effect
upon the contract of the parties, impairs its obligation."
Johnson rejected both the constitutional answer certified to the Circuit
Court and the test of impairment.
His opinion 249 repudiated the need for determining the contro-
versy on any constitutional grounds. Since Kentucky had included
the compact provision in its State Constitution, the Justice stated: 210
"While the [Kentucky] constitution continues unrepealed, it is
putting a fifth wheel to the carriage to invoke the contract into this
cause."
Since the State Legislature must act within the local constitution, the
compact provisions must be observed. If the acts violated the Ken-
tucky Constitution they were void. No federal constitutional issue
was, therefore, involved. The federal court merely sat and adjudi-
cated in the capacity of Kentucky judges to determine whether the
statutes were repugnant to the State Constitution.
Johnson felt also that the compact provisions in the State Consti-
tution did not fetter Kentucky to the thousands of intricate land rules
of Virginia as Washington's impairment test outlined. It was enough
that the broad principles of the mother State's land laws were fol-
lowed. Where to draw the line between these two categories was not
in issue, so this difficult question was left unanswered.
251
In addition, procedural grounds were present on which the case
could be decided without the aid of the contract clause. The Circuit
Court in whose jurisdiction the case arose had been created before the
245. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. I, 17-I8 (U. S. 1823).
246. See the quotation from Johnson's letter at page i68, supra.
247. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat I, 69-94 (U. S. 1823).
248. Id. at 84
249. Id. .at 94-107.
250. Id. at 97.
251. Id. at 103-5.
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State of Kentucky existed. By the Judiciary Act of 1789, the practice
of Virginia was made the practice for this federal court which con-
tinued even after Kentucky became a sovereign power. Under the
accepted practice, the plaintiff who proved his title, as had been done
in the instant case, would get judgment. So the Kentucky statutes of
1797 and 1812 could not: 252
" . . . lay the courts of the United States under an obligation to
withhold from a plaintiff the judgment to which, under the estab-
lished practice of that Court, he had entitled himself."
Also, even assuming the federal court has acquiesced in Kentucky prac-
tice which would deny recovery until the statutory provisions were ful-
filled, still the provision for a Board of Commissioners to determine
the legal relief could not be permitted.2 53 The right of trial by jury
guaranteed under the Seventh Amehdment of the Federal Constitution
would thus be denied, so the acts would be void.
25 4
On strict legal principles, Justice Johnson solved the controversy
correctly. But again the majority grasped the opportunity to entrench
the power of the Federal Judiciary over the States. As a result of this,
an interesting sidelight on the case was revealed. The actual majority
group consisted of only three of the seven Justices. Marshall did not
sit, for one of his relatives was interested in the case; Todd, the Ken-
tucky Justice, and Livingston were absent because of illness; and
Johnson refused to decide on the constitutional issue.255 The public
demanded some curb for nullification of state statutes by a minority
of the Supreme Court, so Senator Johnson of Kentucky introduced a
bill to require the concurrence of all seven Justices to declare a Con-
gressional or state statute unconstitutional. Senator Martin Van
Buren reported the revised bill, requiring concurrence of only five' of
the seven Justices, from the Committee on the Judiciary. The bill
was defeated on the Senate floor, and the first attempt to restrain the
Supreme Court had failed.
25 6
From these opinions by Mr. Justice Johnson, his treatment of
the contract clause may be noted. Two policies guided his thought:
no constitutional issue should be decided unless the solution of the
252. Id. at io6.
253. The majority had interpreted the Board of Commissioner's authority to act
only in controversies between the states. Private persons were unaffected by the
Board. It was necessary to interpret it thusly for the defendant had pleaded that the
federal court was without jurisdiction as the plaintiff had not gone through the pro-
cedure before the Board of Commissioners. Id. at go-gi. Johnson interpreted the
Board's authority to extend to private controversies deciding the legal relief to be
granted. To this the federal court could not be bound.
254. Id. at iO7.
255. 2 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 208, at ioo-io2.
256. 2 WA iEN, op. cit. supra note 2o8, at 123-4.
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controversy absolutely demanded it; no state should be shackled by the
impairment prohibition under a strict interpretation of Section Io.
This latter doctrine was further proclaimed in Ogden v. Saunders .2
5 7
Here- Saunders of Kentucky sued Ogden of Louisiana in assumpsit
on bills of exchange accepted by Ogden in 18o6 but unpaid at maturity.
Ogden pleaded a certificate of discharge obtained under the New York
Insolvent Debtor's Act of i8oi. Again the Circuit Court certified a
question to the Supreme Court. Was the New York Act of 18oi
constitutional? Johnson held it was, with Marshall violently dissent-
ing. For the first time, the Chief Justice was defeated on a major
constitutional issue. Justice Johnson accomplished this by forsaking
Marshall and aligning himself with the proponents of states rights-
Trimble, Thompson-and Washington on this particular occasion.
Duval and Story followed Marshall.
2 8
Before pursuing Johnson's opinion, the precedents for this case
must be investigated. In Sturges v. Crowinshield,2-59 the New York
Insolvency Act which operated retroactively to discharge debtors was
held unconstitutional as repugnant to the contract clause. M'Millan v.
M'Neill 260 on similar facts followed this precedent only a few months
later. But Marshall dropped a powerful hint of what he would do in
the situation later presented in Ogden v. Saunders when he said: 201
"That the circumstance of the State law, under which the debt was
attempted to be discharged, having been passed before the debt
was contracted, made no difference in the application of the prin-
ciple."
Here was planted the seed for applying the contract clause prohibition
to state statutes operating either retrospectively or prospectively.
Johnson denounced 26 2 the theory that state statutes already
enacted would impair contract obligations created thereafter and
queried : 263
"Why may not the community set bounds to the will of the
contracting parties in this as in every other instance ?"
To him the New York Insolvent Debtor's Act, in effect when the con-
tract was formed, merely set the bounds in which the contracting par-
257. 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827). The bankruptcy portion of the case is discussed
at page 355 et seq., infra.
258. BATES, op. cit. supra note 227, at 129.
259. 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819). Plaintiff sues defendant as maker of two prom-
issory notes. Defendant pleaded a certificate of discharge obtained under authority of
an act passed after the notes were made. The certified question on the constitutionality
of the act was answered in the negative, for the contract obligation was impaired.
260. 4 Wheat. 209 (U. S. i819).
261. Id. at 212-213.
262. 12 Wheat. 213, 271-92 (U. S. 1827).
263. Id. at 289.
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ties could act. This translation was understandable after observing
the Justice's definition of a contract obligation: 264
"Whatever I by my contract give another. a right to require of
me, I by that act lay myself under an obligation to yield or be-
stow. The obligation of every contract will then consist of that
right or power over my will or actions, which I, by my contract,
confer on another."
When the contract was made between Ogden and Saunders, the fac-
tor of the Insolvent Debtor's Act had to be recognized in determining
what right or power over Ogden's will or actions was created in Saun-
ders. Saunders contracted with the knowledge that Ogden would be
protected by the statute so no impairment of any .contract obligation
resulted when the act was applied. Marshall elucidated the
contrary: 265 -
"But insolvent laws are to operate on a future, contingent,
unforeseen event. The time to which the word 'impairing' ap-
plies, is not the time of the passage of the act, but of its action on
the contract. That is, the time present in contemplation of the
prohibition. The law, at its passage, has no effect whatever on
the contract . . . When then does its operation commence? Then,
if ever, and not until then, it acts on the contract, and becomes
a law impairing its obligation."
In this manner, the Chief Justice sought to protect the creditor class
from any interference with their contract obligations, even by statutes
enacted before the contract was formed. He believed that the "re-
form government" was organized in 1787 to rectify the commercial
antagonism which existed between the' creditor and debtor classes.
Only a literal meaning of Section io could produce this relief in his
eyes.206  At least, Marshall was consistent with his dictum in M'Millan
v. M41'Neill. What he apparently attempted to do was to protect the
liberty to contract, unhampered by any insolvency laws which injured
the creditor group's claims against the debtors. An attempt was thus
made to maintain the independence and power of creditors in face of
the growing political strength'of the debtor class.
267
Justice Johnson refused to be bound by this "severe literal con-
struction" of Section 1O: 268
264. Id. at 282.
265. Id. at 337.
266. Id. at 354-5.
267. Sharp, Movement in Supremw Court Adjudication (1932) 46 HArV. L. R-v.
361, 366-71. Sharp explained that Marshall's attempt to protect the liberty of contract
did not attain recognition until the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
268. 12 Wheat. 213, 286 (U. S. 1827).
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"It appears. to me, that a great part of the difficulties of the cause,
arises from not giving sufficient weight to the general intent of
this clause in the constitution, and subjecting it to a severe literal
construction, which would be better adapted to special pleadings.
S..But to assign to contracts, universally, a literal purport
and to expect from them a rigid literal fulfillment, could not have
been the intent of the Constitution. It is repelled by a hundred ex-
amples. Societies exercise a positive control as well over the in-
ception, construction and fulfillment of contracts as over the form
and measure of the remedy to enforce them." 269
Furthermore, the general proposition that a government necessarily
violates the contract obligation by putting an end to its performance
was not true. 270
"It is the motive, the policy, the object, that must characterize
the legislative act, to affect it witl the imputation of violating the
obligation of contracts."
This principle of a liberal construal has become the accepted con-
stitutional doctrine. A wide field of statutes affecting contract obliga-
tion has been permitted to enforce the state's police power.2 7 1  And to-
day the interpretation announced by Johnson has been adopted to per-
mit the retrospective operation of a law to give debtor's relief. In
Home Building and Loan Asso. v. Blaisdell,2 72 Chief Justice Hughes
spoke for the majority and said: 273
269. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Wood v. Lovett, 313 U. S. 362
(1941) relied upon this statement and remarked at page 382: "The accuracy of this
statement cannot be questioned by one who reflects upon the extent to which contracts
and agreements are a part of the daily activities of our society. For, so nearly uni-
versal are contractual relationships that it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of
laws which do not have either direct or indirect bearing upon contractual obligation.
Therefore, it would go far toward paralyzing the legislative arm of state governments
to say that no legislative body could ever pass a law which would impair in any manner
any contractual obligation of any kind." The majority opinion in this case held a
statute, repealing a curative statute which gave the vendee of the tax title a valid
ownership, in violation of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution because it
impaired the obligation of the contract between the State and its vendee.
270. Id. at 291.
271. Butchers Union Slaughterhouse v. Crescent City Livestock Co., iii U. S.
746 (1884), the exclusive right to unload livestock granted by the Louisiana Legislature
may be repealed for health reasons without violating the contract clause; Union Dry
Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp., 248 U. S. 372 (igig), a contract to provide
electricity made by private persons can be abrogated by a Georgia statute to enforce
regulation of public utilities without violating Section io.
272. 290 U. S. 398 (1934). The Minnesota Moratorium Law of April 18, 1933,
providing, during the declared emergency, for an extension of the usual one year period
of redemption on foreclosure sales was held constitutional. The State court was to fix
an equitable redemption period, but in no case was the period to last beyond May I,
1935. Although the relief granted was only an extension of a year at most, still the
contract obligations created before the passage of the act were altered. Section IO was
held inapplicable to this retrospective legislation. The mortgage forclosure crisis in
the farming area created ample economic and social reasons for condoning this Minne-
sota action to protect the general welfare of the State.
273. Id. at 428.
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"But full recognition of the occasion and general purpose of the
clause does not suffice to fix its precise scope . . . To ascertain
the scope of the constitutional prohibition we examine the course
of judicial decisions in its application. These put it beyond ques-
tion that the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be
read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. Justice
Johnson in Ogden v. Saunders, adverted to such a misdirected
effort. .
Thus, in this decision, often termed the greatest contract clause deci-
sion in constitutional history excepting the Dartmouth College case,
274
Hughes credited Justice Johnson with the doctrine of a liberal con-
struction for Section io. The Minnesota legislation ending the literal
performance of contract obligations, was held constitutional because
of the "motive, the policy and the object" to give relief during the eco-
nomic crisis confronting the State. So over a century after his judg-
ment on the spirit of this clause, Johnson's opinion wielded powerful
influence.
2 7
5
The final disposition of Ogden v. Saunders saw Johnson's return
to the Marshall group. Since the State statute was held constitutional,
the problem remained whether Saunders, a citizen of Louisiana, was
bound by the New York discharge. Johnson now spoke for Marshall,
Story, Duval, and himself. As the plaintiff had not been within the
jurisdiction of New York when the discharge was granted, the State
could not affect his relation with Ogden. No discharge of a state
could operate beyond its borders to modify the foreign creditor's
claim.
2 76
Justice Johnson's rule of deciding a constitutional case on proce-
dural grounds if possible was again followed in Satterlee v. Mathew-
son.2 7 7 The majority through Justice Washington held a Pennsylva-
nia statute which made a void contract valid no impairment of a con-
tract obligation. In fact it did just the contrary, so Section io was
not violated. The plaintiff had sought ejectment, proving a deed
which established a Connecticut title in Pennsylvania land. A peculiar
Pennsylvania rule barred these titles from legal significance so eject-
274. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 2, at iO9.
275. See also East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, et a[., 66 S. Ct. 69 (1945),
wherein Justice Frankfurter followed Johnson's opinion in the Ogden case, stating at
page 70: ". . . when a widely diffused public interest has become enmeshed in a net-
work of multitudinous private arrangements, the authority of the state to safeguard
vital interests of its people is not to be denied by abstracting one such arrangement
from its public context and treating it as .though it were an isolated private contract
constitutionally immune from impairment."
276. 12 Wheat. 213, 358-69 (U. S. 1827). Precedent for this holding was found
in Watson v. Bourne, IO Mass. Rep. 337 (1813), where a Rhode Island discharge was
denied as a defense against one who was a Massachusetts citizen and did not enter
Rhode Island's jurisdiction during the insolvency proceedings.
277. 2 Pet. 380 (U. S. 1829).
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ment was denied in 1825, but the Supreme Court of the State granted
a new trial. In 1826, a statute removed the invalidity of plaintiff's
title. When the State Supreme Court decided on the new appeal it
held valid the Connecticut deed giving title. Johnson concurred 27s
on the narrow ground that since a new trial had been granted on the
first appeal, ihe plaintiff's rights had not as yet been determined. The
Pennsylvania statute was then applied prospectively and the title deed
held valid. It was as though the judiciary power of the State had set-
tled conflicting decisions on this issue so the valid legal right proved
after the settlement must be sustained, even if no actual claim would
have existed previously. No question of the contract clause was, there-
fore, involved.
. If it had been, the Justice left no doubts as to his attitude on such
statutes: 279
"To give efficacy to a void contract, is not, it is true, violating a
contract, but it is doing infinitely worse; it is advancing to the very
extreme of that class of arbitrary and despotic acts, which bear
upon the individual rights and liabilities, and against the whole of
which the Constitution most clearly intended to interpose a pro-
tection commensurate with the evil."
This vehemence was startling. Certainly when persons contracted
they intended to be bound. Unenforceable obligations were not toler-
ated in the commercial world. If some legal quirk barred enforcement
of an intended obligation as in this case, the rectifying legislation merely
destroyed an unintended defense. It did not impose an unintended
obligation. How could this act be "arbitrary and despotic?" Unfor-
tunately, no clear controversy on this issue ever arose. It would have
proved interesting to observe whether the Justice, who persisted in a
narrow application of the impairment prohibition, could have expanded
Section io to include this situation which had just the opposite mean-
ing from the impairment of a contract obligation. Quite probably,
Johnson had a basis for holding such legislation invalid under the ex
post facto law phrase of Section io as he interpreted it. In both Ogden
v. Saunders 280 and Satterlee v. MatheWson, 281 the Justice had ex-
pressed the belief that the difficulties in the contract clause cases re-
sulted from a misconception of the meaning of ex post facto laws. The
other Justices had applied it only to criminal cases; Johnson employed
if for civil cases, too. On the authorities before 1787, he was correct
278. Id. at 414-16.
279. Id. at 414-15.
280. 12 Wheat. 213, 286 (U. S. 1827).
281. 2 Pet. 380, 416 (U. S. 1829).
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as he indicated in a special memorandum submitted to the Court.2812
But a belief arose among the Constitutional delegates that civil statutes
were not covered by the ex post facto law phrase. 28 3  Also in Calder v.
Bull,284 the Supreme Court had stated that civil statutes were not
barred under the ex post facto law prohibition. The phrase on impair-
ment of contract obligations, it was contended, had been included to
cover the civil acts. Once starting on the wrong foot, the Court had
to toil uphill to protect contract obligations from retroactive legisla-
tion .2 5  Johnson's interpretation which had been the accepted prin-
ciple before 1787 286 would have been an easy method to destroy the
retroactive state statutes and probably would have made'the impairment
phrase a superfluous prohibition. This development would explain
the Justice's strong language against the constitutional situation in
Satterlee v. Mathewson.
Once again the Virginia-Kentucky compact 28 7 was confronted in
Hawkins et al. v. Barney's Lessee.28 8  Kentucky adopted a period of
seven years for its Statute of Limitations on real property actions; Vir-
ginia had a twenty years' period. Justice Johnson applied his dictum
in Green v. Biddle,2 9 to hold that Kentucky was not shackled in its
sovereign power to the intricate details of Virginia land law. If the
general principles were followed, the compact obligation was fulfilled.
Since the rule of a Statute of Limitations had been retained, no breach
of the obligation of contract was created by the seven years' Statute.
A "strict literal construction" was denied by a unanimous court. This
decision involved the constitutionality of the Kentucky Act, as John-
son stated. No mention of Section IO was made, however, which
implies that the Justice's opinion in Green v. Biddle, applying the
Kentucky Constitution only, was adopted. If true, the other members
of the Court had forsaken their custom of imposing the Federal Con-
stitution whenever possible, and had accepted Johnson's rule of not
applying the contract clause where it was unnecessary for a decision.
282. 2 Pet. 68i,-Appendix I (U. S. I829).
283. See page 345, supra.
284. 3 Dall. 386 (U. S. 1798). After the appeal period had expired, a Connecticut
law was passed to permit an appeal to be made. Such was constitutional on the
grounds that the Legislature had power to alter Judicial decisions anyway, so a fortiori
it could provide an appeal.
285. Smead, The Ride against Retroactive Legislation (1936) 20 MiNN. L. REv.
775, 792-3. Smead contends Justice Johnson was right in his interpretation of the ex
post facto phrase to cover both criminal and civil laws.
286. Id. at 791 n. 51; CoRwiN, TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934) at 57,
198 r. 9.
287. See pages 352-3, supra.
288. 5 Pet. 457 (U. S. 1831).
289. 8 Wheat. I, zO3-5 (U. S. 1823).
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The last contract clause opinion by Justice Johnson came in 1833.
The Pennsylvania statute in Lessee of Livingston v. Moore 2 90 per-
mitted certain State Commissioners to sell real property to satisfy liens
held by the State on the realty. These liens had been in existence prior
to the act permitting a sale for satisfaction. The lessee of Livingston
claimed that the contract obligation of the liens was impaired by this
order to sell; but when Moore offered a title derived from such a sale
in defense of an ejectment action, the unanimous opinion of the Court
sustained his title. The State statute was summarily held to be no
violation of the cdntract clause; Moore's title was valid.
These last two cases indicated how far the Supreme Bench had
advanced. No federal constitutional decision was to be given unless
necessary; a strict literal interpretation was not to be applied to Sec-
tion IO. The wise observations of Justice Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck
had become accepted law. The opinion of one Justice had grown in
two decades' time to unanimous opinions as Marshall's original prin-
ciples were erased. Such was the effect of Johnson's interpretations
of the contract clause.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
As early as July 13, 1785, the Confederation had recognized the
need for some national power to regulate commerce among the inde-
pendent states. A Committee of the Continental Congress suggested
at that time that this legislative body should be vested with the
power 291
"of regulating the trade of the States as well with foreign nations
as with each other."
The trade barriers erected by one state's duties and imposts had fos-
tered retaliatory measures from neighboring states.
292
Aware of this rival, hostile spirit, the commercially-minded dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention had adopted without dissent the
commerce clause. 293  None, apparently, questioned the scope of the
authority granted; no doubt appeared as to its meaning.294 Yet it
would be difficult to conceive that the political leaders of 1787 foresaw
the vastness of the power delegated to Congress. It remained for the
290. 7 Pet. 469 (U. S. 1833).
291. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928) 569.
292. HAM ILTOx, THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Everyman's ed. 1934) 103. See also
No. 7 at 28-9 and No. II at 52-3.
293. U. S. CONST. ART. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have power . . To regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
294. WARREN, op. cit. supra note 291, at 570.
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Supreme Court to unfold the full extent of Congressional authority.
That this process has proceeded with wisdom, as a general rule, was
conceded by Charles Warren, the eminent Supreme Court historian.295
"To untrammeled intercourse between its parts, the American
Union owes its preservation and strength. Two factors have
made such intercourse possible-the railroad, physically; the Su-
preme Court, legally."
But the High Court did not immediately fulfill the destiny of Sec-
tion 8. It began as a slow process. In fact, not until 1824 was the
original decision rendered-a silence of thirty-five years was broken
with the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden.290  Compared with the
commerce clause opinions today, this absence of a decision was remark-
able. In I937, 16 opinions from a grand total of 152 opinions read by
the Court had as subject matter the commerce power, while in 1938
the figure was 22 out of 141.297 Before investigating Johnson's work
in this important precedent for the modern decisions, several facts
must be noted to explain the significance of the controversy in 1824.
James Monroe, re-elected to the Presidency in 1820, continued to
promote his Jeffersonian policies. In 1822, Congress adopted the
Cumberland Road Bill providing for toll-gates on the federal high-
way to be operated by the national government. Congress presumed
that since federal funds built the interstate highway such federal regu-
lation was permitted. On May 4, 1822, Monroe vetoed the act and
sent a lengthy message to Congress discussing the commerce power
delegated to that body. The pith of the President's theory was this : 29S
"Commerce between independent powers or communities, is uni-
versally regulated by duties and imposts. It was so regulated by
the States before the adoption of this Constitution equally in re-
spect to each other and to foreign powers. The goods and ves-
sels employed in the trade are the only subjects of regulation. It
can act on none other. A power, then, to impose such duties and
imposts in regard to foreign nations, and to prevent any on the
trade between the States, was the only power granted."
Such was the Chief Executive's explanation of the cormerce clause-
narrow and illogical. Illogical because the framers of the Constitution
in another section had specially provided for the prohibition of state
295. I WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922) C. VIII.
296. 9 Wheat. I (U. S. 1824). For a discussion of the long absence of a decision
on this section see 2 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1929) 721.
297. Hart, The Supreme Court-1937 and 7938 Terms (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv.
579, 602-3.
298. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 17th Cong., Ist Sess. (1822), 1809, 1833.
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duties, imposts, and tonnage duties unless Congress consented.29 9 This
provision would completely embrace Monroe's concept of the com-
merce authority in Congress, and the grant of power under Section 8
would be superfluous. This contention was hardly plausible in a char-
ter recognized for its brevity and succinctness. Although state duties
and imposts were the major cause of commercial upheaval before 1787,
the commerce clause was probably included to guard the Union from
the dangers of other state regulation. 00 Specific perils could not be
enumerated, but the general hazards were recognized, and Section 8
acted as a safeguard.
After his veto message, James Monroe requested an informal
opinion from the Supreme Court on the extent of federal authority
over internal improvements. Justice Johnson replied for the Court: 301
"The Judges are deeply sensible of the mark of confidence be-
stowed on them in this instance and should be unworthy of that
confidence did they attempt to conceal their real opinion. Indeed,
to conceal or disavow it would be now impossible as they are all
of the opinion that the decision on the Bank Question 3 02 com-
pletely commits them on the subject of internal improvements, as
applied to Post Roads and Military Roads . . . The principle
assumed in the case of the Bank is that the granting of the prin-
cipal power carried with it the grant of all adequate and appro-
priate means of executing it. That the selection of these means
must rest with the General Government, and as to that power and
those means the Constitution makes the Government of the United
States supreme."
Since Congress was deemed to have power over foreign and interstate
commerce, the analysis of the Bank decision would signify that "all ade-
299. U. S. CONST. ART. I, § I0: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Con-
gress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: . . . and all such Laws shall be
subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress. No State shall, without the Con-
sent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage ..
300. MADIsoN, THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Everyman's ed. 1934) 214-15. See also
Sholley, Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause (1936) 3 U. OF CHI. L. R.
556, 562. But see Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication (1933) 46 HAIv.
L. R. 593, 594, wherein it was stated that it has not been adequately shown that it was
against the more subtle types of interference with interstate commerce, condemned by
modern cases, that the general affirmative words of the commence clause were directed.
301. 2 WARREN, op. cit. supra'note 295, at 56. Justice Johnson suggested that the
President should publish and distribute the opinion in the Bank case, McCulloch v.
Maryland, throughout the Union. This extra-official opinion rendered by the Court
was most unusual and could not happen today. See HUGHES, THE SUPRFME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES (1928) 30-31.
3o2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819). A Maryland statute
taxed the issuance of any notes by a bank or its branch which was not chartered by the
Maryland Legislature. The Baltimore branch of the United States Bank, created by
Congress, refused to pay the tax. Maryland sued to recover the penalties prescribed
by the statute. Marshall held that Congress had power to create the National Bank,
and having such power could provide for the issuance of banknotes as a necessary
business procedure of a bank. Since the State statute. interfered with this federal
power, it was void.
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quate and appropriate means of executing it" had been granted to Con-
gress also. This informal hint from Johnson indicated that the
Supreme Bench would probably not be shackled by as narrow an inter-
pretation of the commerce power as Monroe's veto message had pro-
claimed.
Only the next year, the Justice faced a controversy involving
foreign commerce in the Sixth Circuit Court at Charleston. In Elkison
v. Deliesseline,303 a British negro sailor, imprisoned under a South Car-
olina statute, sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal Court. The
statute provided that all free negro sdilors entering the State on any
vessel Inust be detained in the local jail until the ship sailed. Once
before a similar situation had occurred, and Johnson had voluntarily
prevailed on the State Judiciary to release the entire crew who had
been detained.30 4 This temporary solution did not solve the problem,
however, so Judge Johnson sought to rectify the outrage in the legal
controversy now presented to him. The actual holding of the decision
could be stated in a short space and on narrow grounds: the authority
to issue a writ of habeas corpus under Section 14 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 existed only when the prisoner was detained in the custody of
federal officers so none could be issued here where the State officers
held the sailor; the civil writ of de homine replegiando 305 which the
British negro also requested could be issued, for such must be given to
any free man who petitioned for it. 30 6 Had the Judge rested here, the
case would probably pass unnoticed in the mass of lower court deci-
sions which have been reported. But this did not happen. Carefully
he recited the prohibitory effect which the act had upon foreign com-
merce. Captains, fearful of losing crew members, would avoid South
Carolina ports. In fact, the statute was so severe it made no exception
for negro sailors who entered the harbors on a ship even in an
emergency. Charleston, the great port of the State, would become a
neglected city.
The Justice, in addition, skillfully indicated the retaliatory meas-
ures which other nations would impose against South Carolina sailors
and American crews. This warning of the economic folly of the stat-
ute was followed by a legal analysis of the quantity of power in Con-
gress over foreign' commerce.
3 7
303. 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,366, at 493 (C. C. D. S. C. 1823).
304. Id. at 493-4.
305. "A writ which lies to replevy a man out of prison, or out of the custody of a
private person, upon giving security to the sheriff that the man shall be forthcoming
to answer any charge against him." BLACK, LAw DIcTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) 514.
306. Johnson doubted if this writ would be of practical aid in this situation, how-
ever. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, cited supra note 303, at 497.
307. Id. at 495.
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"But the right of the general government to regulate commerce
with the sister states and foreign nations is a paramount and exclu-
sive right . . . That this has been the received and universal con-
struction from the first day of the organization of the general gov-
ernment is unquestionable; and the right admits not of a question
any more than the fact . . . It is true that it [Constitution] con-
tains no prohibition on the States to regulate foreign commerce.
Nor was such a prohibition necessary, for the words of the grant
sweep away the whole subject, and leave nothing for the States to
act upon."
This principle of exclusiveness over the commerce power was an
extreme interpretation for 1823. It was most questionable if Congress
did have this authority, for no authoritative decision had as yet-illumin-
ated Section 8. 3°1 In the light of his veto message, President Monroe
would certainly question the broad rule announced by Johnson, while
the legislators of South Carolina demonstrated they had not accepted
this interpretation as the "universal construction" of the commerce
clause. When the Judge proclaimed the State statute repugnant to
the commerce power in the Constitution and void,309 bitter criticism
swept through the State.310 Much pressure had been exerted on the
Judge to suppress his sweeping opinion, but Johnson had abided by
his convictions. The Charleston Mercury assailed the Justice by ex-
pressing the general sentiment of the local populace: 311
"Or are we to understand that when a citizen becomes a servant
of the General Government, he is to disregard the views, opinions,
and feelings of those among whom he was bred, and from whose
3o8. See HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Everyman's ed. 1934) 154, where
Hamilton analyzed the constitutional problem of interpreting federal and state author-
ity: "We there find that, notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities,
there has been the most pointed care in these cases where it was deemed improper that
the like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the
exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists altogether
of such provisions. This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the conven-
tion, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of the act. . . ." By this
test, the only prohibition on state authority over foreign commerce was the laying of
any imposts or duties on imports or exports. Other authorities were apparently held
with Congress, concurrently.
309. Judge Johnson also invalidated the statute for conflicting with the United
States Commercial Treaty with Great Britain since the Federal Treaty was supreme
under Article 6 of the Constitution. See Elldson v. Deliesseline, cited .upra note 303,
at 495-6.
310. 4 BEvRIoGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919) 382-3.
311. Caroliniensis (1823) 3o. This pamphlet of articles on the famous case ap-
pearing in the Charleston Mercury indicated that the legal decision covered only the
jurisdictional ground for issuance of the two writs desired. It also presented argu-
ments for upholding the statute as constitutional alleging that the local government
could regulate foreign commerce to maintain domestic peace and order while the Fed-
eral Treaty did not actually conflict with the act.
But argument over the noted opinion was not confined to South Carolina. It ex-
tended to New England, also. See 6 ADAMS, MEOIRS OF JOHN Q. ADAMS (1875)
176.
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early notice of him, he perhaps derives the exalted honor of being
a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States ?"
The Justice fought this criticism. He endeavored to prohibit the
enforcement of the Statute, even pleading for aid to fulfill this task from
the Chief Executive in Washington. 312  But he lost the fight. South
Carolina openly enforced the imprisonment statute for twenty-five years
afterwards. 13  This defeat resulted from his violation of a primary
rule for deciding constitutional issues established by the Judge as early
as i8io in Fletcher v. Peck 314-no constitutional decision should be
made unless other grounds for decision were non-existent. One pos-
sible explanation for this amazing dicta was Johnson's belief that com-
merce was a vital element in the life of his native State as well as his
country. He desired to protect this precious economic asset from any
retaliatory regulations imposed by other jurisdictions.3 15
Further dicta in the opinion must also be scrutinized. The stat-
ute had been intended to prevent the intercourse of rebellious ideas from
the free negro to the slave. Practically, it worked just the contrary,
demonstrated the Justice. Since it brought free negroes ashore to the
local jails, closer contact with slaves was possible, which Johnson pri-
312. APPENDIX TO CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., Ist Sess. (1850) I661. Letter of July
3, 1824, from Johnson to Secretary of State Adams. "I know not from whom the Gov-
ernment expects communications such as the present, but I am daily made sensible that
the eyes of the community are turned most particularly to the Judges of the Supreme
Court for protection of their constitutional rights, while I feel myself destitute of the
power necessary to realize that expectation. Hence, although obliged to look on and
see the Constitution of the United States trampled on by a set of men who, I sincerely
believe, are as much influenced by the pleasure of bringing its functionaries into con-
tempt, by exposing their impotence, as by any other consideration whatever, I feel it
my duty to call the attention of the President to the subject, as one which may not
be unworthy of an official remonstrance of the Executive of the State." The Justice
then admitted that the negro sailor received only twelve lashes for his entrance into
Charleston, but the act allowed the State court to inflict twelve thousand, if need be;
hence, the sanction of the statute was most severe.
In a later portion of the same letter the Judge stated that the only federal relief
which could be given the negro sailors was in a damage suit. But the weakness of this
aid was obvious for the mariners had no friends, funds, or time to produce success in
such an action.
313. BATES, TE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1936) i27-8.
314. See pages 346, 351, supra.
315. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, cited supra note 303, at 495, where Johnson
stated: "If this law were enforced upon such vessels, retaliation would follow; and
the commerce of this city, feeble and sickly, comparatively, as it already is, might be
fatally injured. Charleston seamen, Charleston owners, Charleston vessels, might,
eo nomine, be excluded from their commerce, or the United States involved in war and
confusion."
In The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. I (U. S. 1821), Johnson had dissented to a
strict construction of a Commercial Treaty with Spain which the majority required in
order to qualify a vessel as a neutral ship not subject to a Prize Court. Story spoke
for the majority and stated that unless a formally prescribed passport was annexed to
the ship's papers the boat could not be protected from condemnation. Johnson replied
if in substance the passport requirement was fulfilled this was sufficient in order to
permit freedom of commerce for American ships and goods which was the intent of
the Treaty. See especially from 87-8, where the strong desires of the Justice to pro-
tect freedom of commerce were noted.
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vately believed defeated the intent of the State Legislature. But even
assuming the legislation sensible; Johnson judicially believed the com-
merce clause must prevail. 316 The Judge trod delicate ground here,
for the state police power to preserve peace and order was involved.
The manner in which he summarily stated that Section 8 was supreme
must be disputed. The state police power should have been consid-
ered to a greater extent and given due weight in his analysis of this
difficult conflict.
Since Elkison v. Deliesseline could be limited to jurisdictional
grounds, these strong dicta, one of which invalidated thie State statute,
were foolish gestures-unwise politically and injurious legally. Chief'
Justice Marshall has exposed his views on this opinion in a letter to
Justice Story: 317
"Our Brother Johnson, I perceive, has hung himself on a demo-
cratic snag in a hedge composed entirely of thorny States-rights.
in South Carolina, and will find some difficulty, I fear, in getting
off into smoother, open ground. . . . You have, it is said, some
laws in Massachusetts, not very unlike in principle to that which
our -brother has declared unconstitutional. We have its twin
brother in Virginia; a case has been brought before me in which
I might have considered its constitutionality, had I chosen to do
so; but it was not absolutely necessary, and as I am not fond of
butting against a wall in sport, I escaped on the construction of
the act."
Usually eager to assert national power, Marshall had refused to tread
this path which Johnson now eagerly followed. The Associate Jus-
tice thereby revealed his strong feeling regarding the commercial affairs
of the Union. He risked his legal reputation in boldly and inde-
pendently seeking to defifie a broad federal power when such a task
was unnecessary. But this decision only heralded stronger words
which were to come.
In 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden 3 18 was presented to the Supreme
Court and Johnson had his opportunity for a powerful expression on
Section 8. Because of the vast importance of this controversy, its
interesting facts must be fully noted.
3 19
Robert Livingston had secured in 1798, a twenty year monopoly
to navigate by steamboat the rivers and waters of New York State.
In return, the youthful inventor had to produce within two years' time
316. Elldson v. Deliesseline, cited supra note 303, at 496.
317. BATES, op. cit. supra note 313, at 128.
318. 9 Wheat. I (U. S. 1824).
319. CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS (7th ed. I94O) 274-5, where
the facts are outlined.
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a steamship capable of traveling four miles an hour against the Hud-
son River current. The steamship was not produced. 32 0  In 1803 and
1807 the monopoly grant was renewed with Robert Fulton named as
Livingston's partner. Finally, on a hot August day in 1807, Fulton's
steamboat, "The Clermont," made the memorable trip from New York
to Albany at a speed exceeding that required by the grant. So in I8oS
the Legislature granted the parties an extension of time in their
monopoly allowing an additional five years for each steamship com-
missioned with thirty years' period as the maximum for the monopoly.
No other person was permitted to operate a steam vessel in New York
unless licensed by the partnership; any unlicensed vessel was to be
forfeited to the firm. Competition was stymied, but the partnership
flourished. Regular service from New York to Albany and Fulton
Street, New York, to New Jersey was offered to the public. Business
continued to expand as other jurisdictions like the Territory of Orleans
granted the firm monopolies too. The partners eventually controlled
the vital waters around New Orleans which prohibited much competi-
tion on the great Mississippi River System.
The inevitable retaliation soon occurred. A New Jersey act in
1811 permitted any person, who lost his steam vessel through for-
feiture to the firm as prescribed by the New York legislation, to cap-
ture and hold any New York licensed steamship. Connecticut in 1822
prohibited any licensee of Livingston and Fulton from using the State's
waters. Other states proceeded in a similar manner. The scientific
achievement which had accelerated navigation from Pittsburgh to New
Orleans from 100 to 30 days was being shackled by state regulations.321
The blessings of wider markets and increased production were being
stifled under the burdens of local discrimination.
The economic condition, therefore, was acute when Ogden, a
licensee of Livingston and Fulton, sought to enjoin Gibbons, a New
Jersey competitor, from operating his steamboat between Elizabeth-
town, New Jersey, and New York City. Gibbons relied on his license
under the Federal Coasting License Act of 1793 to refute Ogden's New
York license. The New York Court of last resort granted the injunc-
320. The skeptical Legislature was not surprised. It had believed Livingston's
plan a folly and passed the grant amidst catcalls and jeers. Id. at 274.
321. The retaliatory measures usually took two forms: monopolies were granted
to their own citizens by Pennsylvania in 1813, Georgia in 1814, Massachusetts in 1815,
New Hampshire in 1816; or, prohibitions against the licensees of the New York mo-
nopoly in the waters of the state as in Ohio's statute of 1822, where no licensee could
enter the waters of Lake Erie in Ohio unless the privilege of navigation in-New York
waters was granted to Ohio citizens except in case of great emergency where human life
was endangered. See MEYER AND MACGILL, TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
BEFORE i86o (1917) io6-8.
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tion holding no conflict existed between the Federal Act and State
statute.321 On appeal, the Supreme Court dissolved the injunction.
A brief study of the Chief Justice's oft-quoted opinion must first
be made.323  Marshall, after renouncing any strict theory of interpre-
tation of the Constitution, defined the commerce power to include
authority over navigation.
8 24
But the remainder of the opinion was cloudy. No definite expres-
sion was stated whether the commerce clause was an exclusive or con-
current power in the Federal Government, even though this State stat-
ute itself was repugnant to Section 8. Also the "direct collision" between
the Federal Coasting License Act and the New York legislative grant
voided the State statute under the provision for supremacy of federal
laws in Article 6 of the Constitution. 32 5 Thus Marshall's opinion was
ambiguous. It could rest on either ground-the commerce clause or
the supremacy of the federal laws. None could object to this cautious
statement, however. To make a bold declaration on national power
over commerce would have been unwise in a period when states rights
were still strongly supported.
3 26
Johnson's opinion differed greatly. Justice Frankfurter recog-
nized that: 327.
"The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson shows how the
case might have served as a vehicle for unambiguous doctrine
• . . In contrast to Johnson's characteristic trenchancy, Mar-
shall's opinion was either unconsciously or calculatedly con-
fused."
To the concurring Justice,328 no time needed to-be spent discussing
!he conflict between federal and state legislation. The only clear con-
stitutional issue was the attempted regulation of interstate commerce
by the New York act. Such was unconstitutional. Once again the
322. Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488 (N. Y. i820). No discussion of the com-
merce clause was presented in the unanimous opinion.
323. 9 Wheat. I, 186-222 (U. S. 1824).
324. Id. at i89-i9o.
325. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State, to the Contrary notwithsatnding."
326. 4 BEVElDGE, op. cit. =pra note 310, at 442-3. Mr. Justice Frankfurter recog-
nized Marshall's weariness on asserting the full power of exclusiveness in the days of
strong states rights interest. See FRANKFURTER, THE ComMEacaC CLAUSE (1937) 25:
"But he was not full-throated even in announcing his own theory of complete 'exclu-
siveness.' He must have felt the time was not ripe for such contraction of state sov-
ereignty in the name of national interest."
327. FRANKFURTER, op. cit. supra note 326, at 17.
328. 9 Wheat. I, 222-239 (U. S. 1824).
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Justice's conception of the vast importance which commerce played
in the economic life of the nation was expressed.
32 9
"If there was any one object riding over every other in the adopt-
tion of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse
among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints."
Perhaps Johnson unwarrantedly overemphasized the significance of
commerce. 330 After all, the prohibitions on state legislation enumer-
ated in Article i, Section IO 331 of the Constitution were adopted to
unsaddle commerce among the states from the heaviest burdens im-
posed during that period.3 3 2  Nevertheless with his belief in the im-
portance of commerce, Johnson was expected to give an opinion
strongly nationalistic, in order to destroy all state regulation. He ful-
filled expectations.
At the outset, he discarded the use of any theory for interpreting
the words of the Constitution: 3
"In attempts to construe the constitution, I have never found
much benefit resulting from the inquiry, whether the whole, or
any part of it, is to be construed strictly, or literally. The simple,
classical, precise, yet comprehensive language in which it is
couched, leaves at most, but very little latitude for construction.
To the Justice's mind the "precise" language of the Constitution
granted to Congress exclusive power to regulate commerce among the
states: 334
"The 'power to regulate commerce,' here meant to be granted,
was that power to regulate commerce which previously existed in
329. Id. at 23i.
330. Sholley, supra note 300, at 560 n. 16. See Sharp, snpra note 30o, at 597,
wherein Johnson's statement of the commercial object of the Constitution was criti-
cized: ". . . it does not follow that means for preserving commercial freedom not
provided for by the ordinary meaning of words in the Constitution must be implied
from these words."
331. See note 299 sitpra.
332. Sholley, supra note 3oo, at 562. See also Sharp, supra note'3oo, at 594.
333. 9 Wheat. I, 223 (U. S. 1824). There were two theories on constitutional
construction: the liberal view, expounded by Marshall, using the Constitution as a char-
ter for granting impliedly broader powers to the Federal Government than actually
expressed in the document; and the strict view, the corollary to the states rights doc-
trine limiting federal power to the express authority granted. See I WiLLOUGHBY, op.
cit. supra note 296, at 77-80.
334. 9 Wheat. I, 227 (U. S. 1824). Johnson in applying the exclusive power theory
interpreted the prohibitions on state duties or imposts and tonnage taxes, adopted in Sec-
tion IO of Article I, most unusually. Instead of following Hamilton's basis of con-
struction as presented in note 308 .spra, he adopted the other extreme for his inter-
pretation, at 237: "But this whole clause, as to these two subjects, appears to have been
introduced ex abundanti cautela, to remove every temptation to an attempt to inter-
fere with the powers of Congress over commerce, and to show how far Congress
might connsent to permit the states to exercise that power. Beyond those limits, even
by the consent of Congress, they could not exercise it." This strained view has been
criticized by Sholley, supra note 300, at 562.
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the States . . . The States were, unquestionably, supreme; and
each possessed that power over commerce, which is acknowledged
to reside in every sovereign State . . . The power of a sovereign
State over commerce, therefore, amounts to nothing more than
a power to limit and restrain it at pleasure. And since the power
to prescribe the limits to its freedom, necessarily implies the
power to determine what shall remain unrestrained, it follows
that the power must be exclusive; it can reside in but one poten-
tate; and hence the grant of this power carries with it the whole
subject, leaving nothing for the State to act upon."
For these reasons, the New York act regulating interstate commerce
was void since no power had remained in the states for such commer-
cial regulation.
Where Marshall had hesitated, Johnson advanced confidently.
The opinion which the Chief Justice's pen could be expected to write
came from his associate, the very man appointed two decades before
to restrain the nationalism of the Federalist Chief. One historian
has even contended that Marshall feared the publishing of a strong
nationalistic opinion, so he utilized the remarkable talents and political
background of Johnson to produce the real interpretation of the com-
merce clause which the Chief Justice favored. 3 5 This assertion was
most questionable. 3 6  But one fact which is unquestionable was the
reaffirmance given to Johnson's interpretation in. later years.
In Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania,3 37 Pennsylvania sought
to tax a ferry corporation for doing business in the State. The only
property owned in the State by the company was a lease to dock at a
Philadelphia pier. All the rest of the property was locaied in New
Jersey. In substance the tax was upon the discharging of passengers
in Philadelphia which was a tax on commerce between the states so
repugnant to Article i, Section 8 of the Constitution. In holding the
State statute void, Justice Field stated: 338
"Congress alone, therefore, can deal with such transportation, its
non-action is a declaration that it shall remain free from burdens
imposed by State legislation."
335. 4 BEERImGE, op. cit. supra note 310, at 443.
336." By this period, Johnson had already indicated his desire to establish the su-
preme commdrcial authority of the Federal Government in Elkison v. Deliesseline. Also
two years later in 1826 his eulogy delivered at Charleston on Thomas Jefferson re-
vealed sympathy for the Nationalistic ideals. He believed Jefferson's warning to
beware of an overzealous Federal Government was a wise but needless thought at that
late date. Johnson also expressed Jefferson's thoughts, as he interpreted them, on
free commerce. He approved the Louisiana Purchase, as he envisaged a great com-
mercial nation from sea to sea united by "every tie of interest, consanguinity, and feel-
ing." See JoHNSOx, EULOGY ON THOMAS JEFFRSON (1826) at 26-33.
337. 114 U. S. i96 (1884).
338. Id. at 204.
LIFE AND WORK OF JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, JR.
Then the learned Justice impliedly acknowledged Johnson's opinion,
as the actual decision stated in Gibbons v. Ogden.339
"Although the sole point in judgment was whether the State
could regulate commerce on her waters in the face of such
legislation by Congress, yet the argument of the court was that
such attempted control of the navigable waters of the State was an
encroachment upon the power of Congress, independently of that
legislation."
Johnson's, not Marshall's, opinion had held the controversy was de-
cided on the commerce clause alone, independent of any federal legis-
lation.
Also Johnson's contention that where a federal power is exclu-
sive, no state may act upon it, was sustained in Robbins v. Shelby
Taxing District 340 when Justice Bradley wrote: 341
"Another established doctrine of this court is, that where the
power of Congress to regulate is exclusive the failure of Congress
to make express regulations indicates its will that the subject
shall be left free from any restrictions or impositions; and any
regulation of the subject by the States, except in matters of local
concern only . . . is repugnant to such freedom. This was
held by Justice Johnson in Gibbons v. Ogden."
Despite the almost universal credit extended to Marshall in later years
for his decision in the celebrated commerce clause case, much regard
should also be given to Justice Johnson's opinion which sharply
asserted this "unambiguous doctrine" of exclusive federal power.
Several general statements in the Justice's penetrating opinion
were worthy of discussion. He accepted the police power of the state
as permissive impositions on interstate commerce thus acknowledging
a factor which had been undeveloped in Elkison v. Deliesseline. State
health, inspection,342 and quarantine laws were allowed, but they must
not be utilized to regulate the commerce among the states. He even
stated where to draw the dividing line between commerce regula-
tion and police power control:3
4
3
"Wherever the powers of the respective governments are frankly
exercised, with a distinct view to the ends of such powers, they
339. Id. at 211.
340. 12o U. S. 489 (1886). A Tennessee statute which licensed a "drummer"
soliciting business for an Ohio corporation was held unconstitutional for violating the
commerce clause.
341. Id. at 493.
342. Inspection Laws were allowed by Article I, Section io of the Constitution, as
quoted in note 299 supra.
343. 9 Wheat. 1, 239 (U. S. 1824).
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may act upon the same object, or use the same means, and yet
the powers be kept perfectly distinct."
In other words, the state legislature could express the purposes for
which the statute was enacted. If it were for police power control,
then the law might "act upon" interstate commerce.34 4  This rule
of thumb has since been abandoned. The Supreme Court in Railroad
Co. v. Husen 3 45 decided:
3 46
"It [the State] may not, under the cover of exerting its police
power, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate
commerce . 'in whatever language a statute may be framed,
its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable
effect.' "
Legislative intent was outlawed; henceforth the practical effect of the
law determined whether it regulated commerce or was merely an ex-
ercise of the police power.
At least one other judicial thought, however, expressed by Jus-
tice Johnson has -been maintained to this modern time in a highly
refined manner. The basis for the present doctrine of the occupation
of the field may be implied from these words:
347
"The practice of our government certainly has been, on many sub-
jects, to occupy so much only of the field opened to them, as they
think the public interests require."
These remarks alone were not indicative, perhaps, of the doctrine,348
but coupled with his primary belief that the commerce power was ex-
clusive, the real implication was obvious. Federal power would regu-
late only that portion of the entire field subject to Congressional author-
ity which was deemed to the public's best interest. Once regulating a
portion of this field, Congress thereby barred any state action in the
unregulated area, however wise or beneficial. The application of this
rule in relation to the Interstate Comrfherce Commission was illustrated
by Justice Brandeis in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line 49 where Con-
gress had delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission authority
to regulate steam locomotives. An Alabama statute requiring auto-
344. Greeley, What is the Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce
(1887) I HARV. L. REv. 159, 163.
345. 95 U. S. 465 (1877). A Missouri statute enacted to prevent communication
of disease from cattle transported in interstate shipments was declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court, speaking through justice Strong because the "natural and rea-
sonable effect" of the law was to regulate interstate commerce even though the health
of the State was intended to be protected.
346. Id. at 472.
347. 9 Wheat. 1, 233-234 (U. S. 1824).
348. But see Bikle, The Silence of Congress (1927) 41 HARv. L. REV. 200, 203, n.
6, where the significance of this sentence alone, as the germ for the occupation of the
field doctrine, was acknowledged.
349. 272 U. S. 605 (1926).
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matic fire doors for health and safety purposes was held void. The fed-
eral administrative agency had not prescribed this device as it felt
public interest did not require such; however, it had exclusive power
over the entire field of steam locomotive regulation which precluded any
state action.
Probably the most dynamic sentence of Johnson's concurring opin-
ion in Gibbons v. Ogden, however, was the Justice's definition of "com-
merce." He forecast its broad scope in later years : 3.0
"Commerce, in its simplest signification, means an exchange of
goods; but in the advancement of society, labour, transportation,
intelligence, care, and various mediums of exchange, become com-
modities and enter into commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the
agent,35 and their various operations, 352 become the objects of
commercial regulation."
This important declaration supported Attorney General Wickersham's
proposal in 1910 for a Federal Incorporation Act to charter interstate
corporations. Wickersham sought to control the holding companies
which had been created to achieve a national organization for local
state companies in similar businesses. This new-style corporation had
evaded any state regulation, 353 while no federal authority existed to
regulate its operation to prevent unethical manipulations.3 54  The pro-
posed legislation was to cure this unfortunate situation. In reply to
critics who denied any federal authority so broad as to permit the
Incorporation Act, the Attorney General contended "no novel prin-
ciples" of the commerce clause need be created to include such a statute
within its spirit. Justice Johnson's definition of commerce had presaged
350. 9 Wheat. I, 229-230 (U. S. 1824).
351. See note 340 supra.
352. Not until 1935 did the full importance of the "various operations" of industry
as reflected in labor's being a commodity of commerce become recognizable. The state-
ments of finding and of policy for the National Labor Relations Act were amply pre-
dicted in this paragraph of Johnson's opinion. See 49 STAT. 449 (I935), 29 U. S. C.
§ 151 (194o) : "The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or necessary effect
of burdening or obstructing commerce. . . . It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."
353. A complete explanation of the evils arising from the holding company and the
impossibility for proper state regulation was offered in Burco, Inc. v. Whitworth et
aL, Si F. (2d) 721, 734 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936). The holding company was apparently pri-
marily designed to escape the state regulation imposed on the act of doing business in
a state under the rule set out in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U. S.
1839), as Wickersham indicated in Federal Control of Interstate Commerce (igio) 23
HARv. L. REv. 241, 256-257.
354. Wickersham, supra note 353, at 257-258.
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the full extent of the commerce power over 85 years'previously, observed
the Attorney General. And on this 1824 decision he relied for the
constitutionality of his proposed act.355
One may understand therefore, the keen analysis of Section 8
which Justice Johnson had displayed. He recognized the amazing
growth which was to come in the field of commerce; hence, he desired
to formulate a broad translation of authority in order to prepare for
the vast commercial developments. Such early wisdom in interpreta-
tion has allowed Chief Justice Hughes to say: 356
"The Commerce clause has not been enlarged, it has simply been
applied."
The immediate effect of the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden was impres-
sive. Wide acclaim fell upon Marshall for destroying the steamboat
monopoly. This decision was probably the only truly popular one ever
issued by the great Chief Justice. 35' 7 No better indication of the com-
mercial effect of this result could be found than the increase in steam-
boat construction. The number of vessels built in the important years
were: 358
1811-1 1816- 3 1819-34 1822-13 -1825-27
1814- 1  1817- 7 182o-io 1823-15 1826-56
1815-2 1818-25 1821- 5 1824-16 1827-37
Thus were the benefits of cheaper, faster transportation unleashed to
permit commercial progress. Justice Johnson's part in this scene of
American history was truly important as exemplified by his compre-
hensive opinion.
Chief Justice Marshall never attained this clear conception of ex-
clusive federal power over interstate commerce which his associate
displayed. Although Marshall's decision in Brown v. Maryland 359
has been credited with the removal of all doubt over the exclusive
power,3 60 in reality the opinion held the Maryland statute unconstitu-
tional because the prohibition of state duties on imports had been vio-
lated.361 The violation of the commerce clause was merely a second
ground for the invalidity of the act. Two years later the final decision
355. Wickersham, supra note 353, at 258-259.
356. HUGHES, op. Cit. supra note 301, at 142.
357. CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 319, at 204.
358. MEYER AND MAcGILL, op. Cit. supra note 321, at lo8.
359. 12 Wheat.. 419 (U. S. 1827). A Maryland statute licensing wholesale im-
porters of foreign, goods by bale or package was held unconstitutional, so the indict-
ment for a penalty on defendant who refused to obtain the $5o.oo license was quashed.
360. Coleman, The Evolution of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Rates (1914)
28 HARV. L. REV. 34, 42.
361. 12 Wheat. 419, 437-445 (U. S. 1827).
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on Section 8 came in Willson et al. v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 3 6 2
where the exclusive power theory was denounced by the Chief Justice.3 63
Then Marshall concluded that the State act was not repugnant to the
federal commerce power "in its dormant state." Here perhaps was the
complete renunciation of Johnson's skillful theory of exclusive power
over national commerce.3 64  Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognized iome
authority for holding that the Chief Justice had retreated from his "gen-
eralized doctrine of 'exclusiveness' " as found in Gibbons v. Ogden,
but he himself interpreted the decision as expressing the right of Dela-
ware to legislate on its police power.
3 65
These examples of John Marshall's apparent vacillation on the doc-
trine of exclusiveness support the resolution that when a careful anal-
ysis of the commerce clause development has been made, much atten-
tion must be given to Justice Johnson; for only-his far-sighted approach
contemplated the necessary freedom for interstate commerce which uni-
fied this Nation. While most of the credit has been extended to the
colorful Chief Justice,3 66 thoughtful praise should now be awarded also
to William Johnson.
36 7
CHAPTER V
THE CONTEMPT POWER OF CONGRESS
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution 36s has been considered
not for its content but rather for what it failed to contain-the contempt
power of Congress over non-members of the Legislature. Little dis-
362. 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829). The plaintiff who constructed a dam under the
Delaware statute sued the defendant for $20,o00, alleging defendant's fishing sloop hit
the dam, thereby damaging it. Defendanes sloop was licensed and enrolled under the
federal navigation laws. No discussion of this fact occurred which was unusual in view
of Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.
363. Id. at 250.
364. Coleman, op. cit. supra note 36o, at 42-43, wherein Willson et al. v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co. was credited with being an example of Marshall's confusion on
the commerce power as well as introducing the era of the predominance of states
rights in commerce clause decisions.
365. Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 327, at 28-31.
366. For example, see CoRwiN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS
(1936), at 5-13, where Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden was heralded as the
basis for a study of the interstate commerce problem.
367. Justice Frankfurter remarked that John Marshall's celebrated opinion in Gib-
bons v. Ogden represented not a solo performance but rather an orchestral rendition.
Able argument of Daniel Webster and the collaborative work of his Associate Justices.
had much influence. See Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 327, at 42-43. It could also
be said that the subsequent interpretations of the commerce clause did not rely on Mar-
shall's solo but gave cognizance to Johnson's performance also. A duet, perhaps, then
formed the background for the modern symphony of Section 8 decisions.
368. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 5: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Pro-
ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds, expel a Member."
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cussion prevailed in the 1787 Convention over this clause,36 9 and noth-
ing was recorded concerning the general contempt power of the Legis-
lature. In fact, however, little doubt could be found that the delegates
to the Convention intended the Federal Legislature to have power to
cite non-members for contempt. In the early Colonial days and through
the Confederacy no instance could be discovered where legislative bodies
refused to exercise their power over contempt citations. Only in this
manner were disturbances and obstructions to law-making proceedings
eliminated. Authority for this exercise, therefore, remained unques-
tioned.
37 0
The leading case on this subject, in fact, the only case until I88O,37 1
was Anderson v. Dunn.372  In 1818, Lewis Williams, Congressman
from North Carolina, introduced in the House of Representatives a
letter he had received from Captain John Anderson'. Within the en-
velope was a check for $5o0 as "part payment for extra trouble" in
furthering several claims in which the Captain was interested. Repre-
sentative John Forsythe of Georgia moved that the Sergeant-at-Arms
should take Anderson into custody and hold him at the House's direc-
tions. Before the vote, the House's authority to act in this manner was
questioned, but Henry Clay as Speaker replied there was no question
over the House's power to protect its dignity and privileges. The
resolution was then unanimously adopted. When John Anderson was
brought before the House, a motion to discharge him was decisively
defeated, 117 to 42. As the House of Representatives had indefinitely
postponed Anderson's discharge, Thomas Dunn, the Sergeant-at-Arms,
held him imprisoned for two months. Anderson, after exhaustive de-
bate, was held guilty of contempt. Speaker Clay then severely repri-
manded him before the Legislative body after which he was released.37 3
Upon gaining his freedom Anderson sued Dunn for assault and
battery as well as false imprisonment. The defendant pleaded his
official position and the power to punish for contempt which rested in
the House of Representatives to which plaintiff demurred. Justice
Johnson wrote for a unanimous Court and denied recovery to Ander-
son by over-ruling the demurrer. From the extensive debate in the
House over its constitutional authority to hold for contempt, it was
clear that the members considered this power to be given by implica-
369. The only discussion centered around the issue of expelling a member of Con-
gress by a majority or a two-thirds vote. 3 GILPIN, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
(840), at 129o-1291.
370. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926) 74 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 691 and 78o, at 790.
371. Kilbourn v. Thompson, lO3 U. S. i68 (i88o).
372. 6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821).
373. Potts, cited note 370 supra, at 722-723.
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tion. 3 74  Johnson substantiated this view. First he outlined his broad
theory of government: 37
"The science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if,
indeed, that can be called a science which has but few fixed prin-
ciples, and practically consists in little more than the exercise of a
sound discretion, applied to the exigencies of the state as they arise.
It is the science of experiment."
And then he continued: 370
"But there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others,
in the practical application of government, it is, that the public
functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers which
the people have entrusted to them. The interests and dignity of
those who created them, require the exertion of the powers indis-
pensable to the attainment of the ends of their creation."
From this analysis, the practical operations of the Legislative Depart-
ment required that this implied power to commit for contempt should
be sustained: 37
"The source of the power has been recognized to lie in the neces-
sity for self-help and self-defense-the employment of an efficient
instrument to protect the institutions of government from unwar-
ranted interferences with their work."
Nor was it odd that Johnson recognized the practical necessity of this
contempt authority. He had served in the South Carolina House of
Representatives,3 7 8 so experience had taught him the requisites for at-
taining the proper legislative procedure.
In answer to the fears that Congress would exceed what was con-
sidered to be just punishment, the Justice then defined the limits of this
contempt power: 379
"Analogy, and the nature of the case, furnish the answer-'the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'"
374. Id. at 723.
375. 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (U. S. 1821).
376. Ibid.
377. Landis, Constitutional Linitations on the Congressional Power of Investiga-
tion (1926) 40 HARv. L. Ray. 153, 157.
378. See page 164, supra. Marshall had served in the Virginia House of Burgesses
in 1782 and 1787. Justice Duvall was in the House of Representatives from 1794 to 1796.
Justice Story served in Congress in i8o8, while in 18o5 and i8io he was a member of
the Massachusetts Legislature. Justices Livingston and Todd had no legislative ex-
perience. Justice Worthington, due to illness, took no part in the case. The Court
was, therefore, accustomed to legislative proceedings and had less difficulty in implying
the Constitutional authority. Id. at 215 n. 272.
379. 6 Wheat. 204, 230-231 (U. S. 1821).
378 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Also restricting the Legislature were the general considerations of the
extent of this punishment power resting on well-developed prece-
dents: 380
" . . the constitution was formed in and for an advanced state
of society, and rests at every point on received opinions and fixed
ideas. It is not a new creation, but a combination of existing ma-
terials, whose property and attributes were familiarly understood
and had been determined by reiterated experiments. It is not,
therefore, reasoning upon things as they are, to suppose that any
deliberative assembly, constituted under it, would ever assert any
other rights and powers than those which had been established by
long practice, and conceded by public opinion."
The Justice then destroyed the argument that the express power over
members of the Legislature did not signify that this power alone was
intended. It was necessary to give the contempt power over members
as an express provision because of the "delicate nature" of the members
as delegates from confederated states.381 So this express grant did not
preclude the implication of the broader inherent power to punish for
contempts by non-members. 38 2  1
This original doctrine established by Johnson has remained a valu-
able precedent. As late as 1935, the Supreme Court cited for contempt
a witness before a Senate investigating committee who had permitted
the removal and destruction of papers he had been subpoened to pro-
duce. 383  This recent decision probably extinguished any impractical
restrictions placed upon the Anderson decision by Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son.38 4  Hence, as Dean James Landis wrote, Justice Johnson "made
practicality of government into constitutional doctrine" by his full ap-
preciation of the necessity for this implied Congressional power.3 5
380. Id. at 233.
381. This argument applied especially to the Senators who were considered in
those days as quasi-ambassadors representing the organized governments of their re-
spective states. See Potts, note 370 supra, at 792, n. 28.
382. judge Johnson had alreacy recognized the implied power of the federal courts
to punish for contempt even where their authority rested entirely upon statutes. If
the statute failed to express the contempt power, still it could be implied because it
was an inherent power in the judiciary system. See United States v. Hudson, 7
Cranch 32, 34, also discussed at page 185 supra (U. S. 1812).
383. Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935).
384. io3 U. S. 168 (I88O), where it was held that no general power to punish for
contempt was vested in either House of Congress. Only in the limited situation where
the examination of a witness was necessary for the performance of its legislative duty
could Congress fine or imprison a contumacious witness. From pages 196-2oo Ander-
son v. Dunn was commented upon and the broad reasoning of the opinion was over-
ruled and rejected.
385. Landis, note 377 supra, at 213-214.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MILITIA CLAUSES
These two clauses 386 represented a compromise in the Constitu-
tional Convention. Many delegates feared the dangers which might
be created from a large standing army under federal control. The more
enlightened of the body realized, however, that trained men were a
necessity to assure adequate defense. Hamilton severely criticized the
sole reliance upon the state militia indicating that the Revolution had
shown the need for a regular army.3 * In contrast the anti-Federalists
were unsatisfied even with the power reserved to the states for con-
trolling the militia since Congressional authority to call forth the state
troops might be used to harry the citizens of another state in the execu-
tion of national laws.388  Curiously enough, the first important con-
troversy involving the militia clause arose under a Pennsylvania stat-
ute punishing a member of the State militia for refusing to obey the
calling forth of the militia by the federal government. In the critical
days during the Second War with Great Britain, the states apparently
forgot their earlier fears that this Congressional authority was too
great.3s9  In Houston v. Moore 39 0 the High Court had to determine
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute.
Houston, a private in the Pennsylvania militia, was ordered out
by the Governor in pursuance of a requisition of State troops by Presi-
dent Madison in July, 1814. He neglected, however, to march with his
detachment to the appointed rendezvous. Under the State act he was
court-martialed and fined. Houston sued Moore, the deputy marshal,
386. U. S. CONST. ART. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To pro-
vide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the
United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress; ..
387. HAmILTON, THE FEDERAmIST No. 25 (Everyman's ed. 1934), at 122-123.
388. Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitutiom (1940) 54 HAv. L. REV. 181,
184-185; WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928), at 518-520. See also
THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Everyman's ed. 1934), at 137-142, where Hamilton sup-
ported Congressional regulation of the state militia and discountenanced any danger to
the liberty of the states.
389. "The legislature of Pennsylvania . . . saw the defects in the means of co-
ercing her citizens into the service; and, unwilling to bear the imputation of lukewarm-
ness in the common cause, legislated on the occasion just as far as the laws of the
United States were defective, or not brought into operation. And to vindicate her
disinterestedness, she even gratuitously surrenders to the United States the fines to be
inflicted. To have paused on legal subtleties with the enemy at her door or to have
shrunk from duty under shelter of pretexts which she could remove, would have been
equally inconsistent with her character for wisdom and for candour," stated Johnson
in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. I, 45-46 (U. S. 1820).
390. 5 Wheat. I (U. S. 182o).
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in trespass for levying on his property to pay the fine contending that
the State law was repugnant to the Federal Constitution.
Justice Washington spoke for the majority upholding the validity
of the Pennsylvania act.3 1  Under a federal law adopted in 1792, any
delinquent militia-man was to be punished if found guilty by a court
martial of his fellow militia-officers. This act was amended by a law
passed in April, 1814, providing that the militia officers composing
the court martial must be drafted, detached, and called forth into the
service of the United States. By this amendment and similar pro-
visions of the 1814 act, Washington stated that "actual service" was
the criterion of a national militia. Since the punishment under the
Congressional act could only be imposed when the state militia had
been transferred into a national militia it behooved the Court to inves-
tigate the facts to determine if Houston had entered actual federal
service or not. If he had, then the State punishment could not be
inflicted.
392
But here, Congress had not provided for federal punishment for
delinquents until the militia had been drafted into actual national serv-
ice, hence, power still remained in the State to punish Houston. When
Congress enacted its exclusive authority the Pennsylvania act would
be invalid. Since this enactment had not been accomplished Houston
was validly convicted under the State law and Moore was guilty of
no trespass.
Johnson concurred 93  His opinion followed the same theme in
deciding on these particular facts. The Justice, in addition, empha-
sized the facts that the Governor had summoned Houston and that
the militia-man was not in actual national service until he had reached
the rendezvous. Until this time arrived no federal crime was com-
mitted. Pennsylvania by its law was merely filling in the gap to im-
pose a sanction upon its local soldiers to force their compliance with
the State orders issued under the federal requisition.
More important to this opinion, however, was the cogent dictum
by Johnson that both the Federal and State Governments could impose
391. Id. at 12-32.
392. Id. at 23.
393. Id. at 32-47. Johnson admitted that he had not been able to satisfy himself
that this case was a controversy for the cognizance of the Supreme Bench. Plaintiff
must show where some constitutional provision had been violated. Houston had no
complaint for he admitted his illegal act but contended he was guilty under the fed-
eral act only and should therefore not be guilty of a state wrong. While the United
States also could complain of nothing, for the Pennsylvania act was a "candid, spon-
taneous ancillary effort in the service of the United States." Id. at 33. Again Justice
Johnson would be willing to dispose of a case on its jurisdictional question instead of
confronting the constitutional problem which the other Justices saw in the controversy.
"But from respect for the opinion of others," he offered his own remarks on the
question.
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punishment for the same criminal act.394  He contradicted Justice
Washington's statements on this question:3 95
"Why may not the same offence be made punishable both under
the laws of the States, and of the United States? Every citizen
of a State owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and
participates in the government of both the State and the United
States. It is obvious, that in those cases in which the United
States may exercise the right of exclusive legislation, it will rest
with Congress to determine whether the general government, shall
exercise the right of punishing exclusively, or leave the States at
liberty to exercise their own discretion. But where the United
States cannot assume, or where they have not assumed this exclu-
sive exercise of power, I cannot imagine a reason why the States
may not also, if they feel themselves injured by the same offence,
assert their right of inflicting punishment also."
The danger of twice subjecting a person for the same offense and
jeopardizing his life and limb would not arise under this concept of
double allegiance expounded by Justice Johnson because of the "ex-
press restraint upon the exercise of the punishing power." 396 Wash-
ington also believed that where the federal and state courts have con-
current power no double jeopardy would result for the judgment in
one might be pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the other; 397
however, Justice Story in his dissent 3os could not adopt the contention
that a conviction or acquittal in a state court barred federal prosecution,
for such state control over federal jurisdiction was incomprehensible to
this strongly nationalistic Justice.
Subsequent decisions on the problem of double prosecution have
followed Justice Johnson. It must be acknowledged that as early as
394. Id. at 32-36.
395. Id. at 33-34. The doctrine that several sovereignties may punish for the
same crime was also advanced by Johnson at the same term in United States v. Fur-
long, 5 Wheat. 184, 197 (U. S. 182o) : "Robbery on the seas is considered as an
offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punishable
by all; and there can be no doubt that the plea of autre foisr acquit would be good in
any civilized State, though resting on a prosecution instituted in the courts of any other
civilized State." All of Johnson's associates joined in this pronouncement. Apparently
"two distinct wills" could be exercised on one subject simultaneously in this situation.
396. Id. at 34. Undoubtedly Johnson had reference to the Fifth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution.
397. Id. at 31. The question might be asked why Washington should be concerned
with double jeopardy if he really believed that "two distinct wills" could not be exer-
cised simultaneously against the same act. Two crimes in the same act were impos-
sible under his concept.
398. Id. at 47-76. Story considered Houston to be in actual federal service when
the President requisitioned the state troops, otherwise no means for enforcing the na-
tional order was obtained. If a recalcitrant or even uninterested state refused to pro-
vide any punishment and the militia were not in federal service until the rendezvous
was reached, any delinquents before this time would be unpunished. The Federal Gov-
ernment could not be subjected to such a risk-that its commands would be unheeded.
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18o6 Congress enacted criminal statutes with the "saving" clause that
no construction of the statute should deprive the individual states of
jurisdiction over offenses made punishable by the federal act.399 By
today numerous decisions have affirmed the Johnsonian theory that
coordinate power to punish for the same offense might exist in the
Federal and State Governments. 400  Chief Justice Taft tersely sum-
marized, in words reminiscent of Justice Johnson's speaking a century
before, the theory of double sovereignty over a crime when he wrote : 401
"We have here two sovereignties, deriving powei from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same, subj ect-matter within the
same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, en-
act laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legis-
lation can give validity to acts prohibited by the Amendment
(18th). Each government in determining what shall be an of-
fense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sov-
ereignty, not that of the other.
"It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national
and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity
of both and may be punished by each."
Once again Justice Johnson's constitutional interpretation has become
the accepted law, while the belief of his associates was forsaken.
THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE
Little discussion on the bankruptcy power granted to Congress
occurred in the Convention of 1787. When the Committee on Detail
had reported the clause 402 some criticism, arose over the broad power
since bankruptcies were punishable by death under English laws and
several delegates objected to giving this power to the Congress. But
on this extensive and delicate subject, other delegates saw no danger
of abuse of the power by the Federal Legislature. Only Connecticut
voted against the adoption of this section.40 3 'The general attitude of
the public on the bankruptcy clause appeared to favor its adoption with
little discussion taking place over its scope: 404
399. 2 STAT. 405 (i806), Act against counterfeiting.
40o. Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power (1934) 34 COL. L. REv.
995, 1009-1017. "
401. United States v. Lanza, 26o U. S. 377, 382 (1922). Defendant pleaded spe-
cially in bar to the federal prosecution, alleging that the State of Washington had fined
him already for the same offense. The Supreme Court upheld the prosecution's de-
murrer to the special plea permitting double prosecution for the violation of two sepa-
rate liquor statutes-National and State-by the same act.
402. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To estab-
lish . . uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States; " "
403. 3 GILPIN, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (1840) 1481.
4o4. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Everyman's ed. 1934) 217.
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"The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so in-
timately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will pre-
vent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie
or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems
not likely to be drawn into question."
The lack of discussion over this broad power was no criterion of the
controversial issues which might arise from the authority granted.
After the decision in Sturges v. Crowinshield40 5 the business
community and bar were left in doubt over the respective federal and
state power in the bankruptcy field. 4 0  This doubt was resolved in
Ogden v. Saunders.40 7 Since the Court was evenly divided in 1824
the case was reargued in 1825, 1826, and finally in 1827. Because of
the Uniform Bankruptcy Bill pending before Congress, the significance
of this decision also was greatly emphasized.
40 8
As will be remembered, Justice Johnson led the majority uphold-
ing the power of New York State to enact an insolvency law.40 9 The
Justice believed that the use of "uniform" meant no "partial" laws af-
fecting the individual states in different degrees. No absolute pro-
hibition of state laws was intended for no exclusive power had been
conveyed in the "uniform laws" phrase. In addition the commerce
clause acted as an analogy where the states retained power over intra-
state commerce while Congress had authority over commerce among
the states. Nor could any argument be sustained which proposed that
since naturalization rules were to be uniform under the same Section
8, immediately preceding the bankruptcy clause, the general interpre-
tation of its exclusive authority could be implied to bankruptcy laws
too. The states never had naturalization power; hence, they relin-
quished nothing to the Federal Government. Insolvency laws had been
common in the various states under the Confederation, so unless a direct
prohibition was announced the authority to enact them still remained.
Finally the Federal Bankruptcy Act of i8oo had buttressed this theory
of the bankruptcy clause: 4
1 0
that it amounts only to a right to assume the power to
legislate on the subject, and, therefore, abrogates or suspends the
existing laws, only so far as they may clash with the provisions of
the act of Congress."
405. 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 18ig). See also page 354, supra.
406. I WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (Rev. ed.
1926), at 686-687.
407. 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827). This case was discussed previously in connec-
tion with the contract clause at page 354 et seq., supra.
408. I WARREN, op. cit. Upora note 406, at 681-689.
409. 12 Wheat. 213, 273-281 (U. S. 1827).
410. Id. at 278-279. In Wheaton's Reports, this statement was italicized.
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Universal acquiescence in this belief was, therefore, sufficient to uphold
the constitutionality of the New York statute which did not conflict
with any federal act.
The immediate effect of denying exclusive authority to Congress
over bankruptcy laws probably was most unfortunate economcially.
The financial difficulties appearing in the next decade could have been
better alleviated by a national statute instead of the numerous state
laws. 1' But Johnson's views on the bankruptcy problem were entitled
to much more praise than criticism.
To appreciate this laudation, an investigation of the Justice's
booklet proposing a Uniform Bankruptcy Law ought to be made.
412
A summary of his proposals must suffice: the bankruptcy system should
be incorporated into the judicial system of the Federal Government, a
register of bankruptcy should be the common assignee in each district
to operate the bankrupt's estate, security for the creditor against frauds
and unequal distributions of the assets must be given, any person may
become a voluntary bankrupt, only merchants and traders can be forced
into involuntary bankruptcy. In general, all these suggestions were
eventually adopted. The permission .to become a voluntary bankrupt,
as a typical example, was not proposed in the Congressional bill which
was discussed during the 182o's. Not until 1841 did the Federal Leg-
islature enact a law permitting voluntary bankruptcy.41 3 By advanc-
ing this statutory suggestion as early as I82O, Justice Johnson allied
himself with the far-sighted individuals who sought a workable solu-
tion to the bankruptcy situations which protected not only the creditors
but also the unfortunate debtors. He disclosed his general attitude on
debtor relief when he wrote: 414
"For it is among the duties of society to enforce the rights of hu-
manity; and both the debtor and the society have their interests
in the administration of justice, and in the general good; inter-
ests which must not be swallowed up and lost sight of while yield-
ing attention to the claim of the creditor. The debtor may plead
the visitations of Providence, and the society has an interest in
preserving every member of the community from despondency-
in relieving him from a hopeless state of prostration, in which he
would be useless to himself, his family, and the community. When
that state of things has arrived in which the community has fairly
and fully discharged its duties to the creditor, and in which, pur-
suing the debtor any longer would destroy the one, without bene-
4I. I WAiuFN, op. cit. supra note 406, at 692.
412. JonNsoN, A BILL To EsTABLisH A UNIFORM SYsT m oF BANKRUPTCY (1820).
413. 5 STAT. 441 (1841). Marshall had already hinted in Sturges v. Crowinshield,
4 Wheat. 122, 194 (U. S. 1819) that a law allowing voluntary bankruptcy was consti-
tutional.
414. 12 Wheat. 213, 283 (U. S. 1827).
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fitting the other, must always be a question to be determined by
the common guardian of the rights of both; and in this originates
the power exercised by governments in favour of insolvents. It
grows out of the administration of justice, and is a necessary ap-
pendage to it."
Such language on the sound philosophy behind bankruptcy legislation
demonstrated that Johnson was a century ahead of the narrowly legalis-
tic ideas of his associates. One commentator has observed that this ex-
pression in Ogden v. Saunders indicated the heights to which the Jus-
tice could have ascended if he had not at a "relatively early age come
under the restraining influence of Marshall." 41 Chief justice Hughes
also recognized the full implications of Justice Johnson's liberal theories
in the Minnesota Moratorium case when he stated that "the prophetic
words of Justice Johnson in Ogden v. Saunders" forecasted the devel-
opment of liberalized statutes to relieve suffering debtors in order to
protect the State's "fundamental interests." 416 None, therefore, could
deny that the advanced outlook which Johnson utilized on bankruptcy
problems has stamped him as a progressive jurist of the early nine-
teenth century.
CONCLUSION
Any summary of a Justice's thirty years' work must be made with
reservations. No perfectly detailed pattern could be expected. The
strains and stresses of not only political and economic elements but also
personal factors preclude a consistent development and design. Never-
theless, the general scheme is discernible.
First, William Johnson's devoted appreciation of the Constitution
was unquestioned. His own words have removed any doubt which
might arise: 417
"In the constitution of the United States, the most wonderful in-
strument ever drawn by the hand of man, there is a comprehen-
sion and a precision that is unparalleled; and I can truly say, that
after spending my life in studying it, I still daily find in it some
new excellence."
Next, despite the theories of certain Constitutional historians, Jus-
tice Johnson's independence of thinking and freedom from Chief Jus-
415. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1936) 130.
416. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell et al., 290 U. S. 398, 443-444
(1934). See also page 354, mtpra.
417. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 495, No. 4366 (C. C. D. S. C. 1823).
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tice Marshall's restraining influence were disclosed in various incidents
-his persistence in expressing personal opinions whether concurrences
or dissents, and especially the momentous expressions in Gibbons v.
Ogden and Ogden v. Saunders.
Third, when his associates willingly overlooked technical questions
of procedure to establish Constitutional precedents, the Justice refused
to follow. To him the orderly legal process must be maintained even
if the Federal Government were denied support from its judicial depart-
ment. Yet in these very opinions, Justice Johnson hesitated not to
express a fiery spirit of faith in the national government.
As significant historical facts and important legal opinions continue
to unfold, one may predict with certainty that the stature of William
Johnson will grow. Both his independence as a judicial thinker and
his passion for the orderly legal process cannot be forgotten as long
as American Constitutional Law develops upon the firm foundations
which he helped to lay.
41 8
418. Other. articles on Justice William Johnson, Jr., are: Morgan, Mr. Justice
William Johnson and the Constitution (1944) 57 HARv. L. RE.v 328; Levin, Mr. Justice
William Johnson, and the Comnon Incidents of Life (1945) 44 MicH. L. RFv. 59, 243;
Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter (944) 43 MIcH. L. REv. 497.
